Filosofía Teórica
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      • Conferencia – Susanna Siegel (febrero 2014)
      • Conferencia – Christopher Peacocke (febrero 2014)
      • Seminario – Felipe de Brigard (mayo 2014)
      • Ciclo de conferencias – Josefa Toribio (junio 2014)
      • Conferencia – Salma Saab (junio 2014)
      • Seminario – Francisco Pereira (septiembre 2014)
      • Conferencia – Ignacio Cervieri (octubre 2014)
      • Conferencia – Marc Artiga (noviembre 2014)
      • Conferencia- Maja Spener (enero 2015)
      • Conferencia- Susanna Schellenberg (marzo 2015)
      • Conferencia- Alfonso Muñoz Corcuera (mayo 2015)
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SEMINARIO DEL PROYECTO

INVITADOS 

2014

Lorena Domínguez (Programa de Posgrado en Filosofía de la Ciencia, UNAM) presentará el trabajo ‘Epistemología de la percepción anómala: Las alucinaciones’. La ponencia se llevará a cabo el lunes 20 de enero de 2014. 

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Marte Roel (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) impartirá la ponencia ‘Una perspectiva sensoriomotora para explicar la localización sonora’. La charla se llevará a cabo el lunes 3 de marzo de 2014 en la UAM-Cuajimalpa. 

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INVITADOS 

2013

Thomas Meier (Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU) impartió la ponencia ‘Variedades del Realismo Estructural’. La presentación se llevó a cabo el jueves 14 de noviembre de 2013 en la UAM-Cuajimalpa.

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David Ivy (The University of Texas at Austin) presentó el trabajo ‘A Naïve Realist Argument against Intentionalism’ el miércoles 16 de octubre de 2013. VER VIDEO aquí.

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Abraham Sapién (Institut Jean Nicod) impartió la charla ‘Masochism: On How to Like Pain’ el 30 de septiembre de 2013.

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Adriana Renero (The Graduate Center, CUNY) impartió la charla ‘Antireductionism and the Nature of Introspection’ el 23 de septiembre de 2013.

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Resumen: Some philosophers argue that introspection is structurally similar to perception and other mechanisms, or that there is an overlapping of introspection with other mental processes. Hence, no unique way of knowing about our minds, nor any sharp contrast between the way in which we know our minds and other ways of knowing about the world. Instead, a range of different mental processes and mechanisms, or states such as perception and attention, are believed to be involved in introspection. Insofar as introspection is reduced to perception or to other mechanisms and processes, this view is identified as reductionism. I argue for a different theory and discuss how introspection is both different to perception, and also a distinctive way of knowing our mental states.

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Jorge Morales (Columbia University) impartió la charla ‘Variedades de la introspección‘. La ponencia se llevó a cabo el 19 de agosto de 2013.

 

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RESEARCH SEMINAR 

GUESTS 

2014

Lorena Dominguez (Graduate Program in Philosophy of Science, UNAM) will present the paper ‘Epistemology of Abnormal Perception: Hallucinations.’ The talk will be held on January 20th, 2014. 

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Marte Roel (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) will present his paper ‘A Sensorimotor Perspective for Explaining Sound Location.’ The talk will be held on March 3rd, 2014 at UAM-Cuajimalpa. 

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GUESTS

2013

Thomas Meier (Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU) gave a talk on the ‘Varieties of Structural Realism.’ The talk was held on November 14, 2013 at UAM-Cuajimalpa. 

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David Ivy (The University of Texas at Austin) presented the paper ‘A Naïve Realist Argument against Intentionalism’ on October 16th, 2013. SEE VIDEO here.

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Abraham Sapien (Institut Jean Nicod) presented ‘Masochism: On How to Like Pain’ on the 30th of September, 2013.

Adriana Renero (The Graduate Center, CUNY) gave a talk on ‘Antireductionism and the Nature of Introspection’ on the 23rd of September, 2013.

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Abstract: Some philosophers argue that introspection is structurally similar to perception and other mechanisms, or that there is an overlapping of introspection with other mental processes. Hence, no unique way of knowing about our minds, nor any sharp contrast between the way in which we know our minds and other ways of knowing about the world. Instead, a range of different mental processes and mechanisms, or states such as perception and attention, are believed to be involved in introspection. Insofar as introspection is reduced to perception or to other mechanisms and processes, this view is identified as reductionism. I argue for a different theory and discuss how introspection is both different to perception, and also a distinctive way of knowing our mental states.

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Jorge Morales (Columbia University) gave a talk on ‘Varieties of Introspection.’ The talk was held on August 19th, 2013.

 

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